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REFORM OF THE SWISS
FISCAL EQUALISATION
SYSTEM
RENÉ L. FREY* AND
GÉRARD WETTSTEIN**
W
hile Germany and Austria continue to grap-
ple with general federalism reforms, Swit-
zerland approved a complete overhaul of its fiscal
equalisation system by a majority of almost 65 per-
cent in a 2004 referendum.The enormity of this pro-
ject is evident in the fact that 27 of the 196 articles of
the Swiss constitution have since been amended.The
reform came into effect at the beginning of 2008.
This article begins with a brief overview of Swiss fed-
eralism and its longstanding equalisation system,
looking at the various shortcomings that prompted
the federal government and the cantons in 1992 to
undertake a joint, comprehensive reform of the sys-
tem.This is followed by a presentation of the reform
of fiscal equalisation and task allocation between the
Confederation and the cantons, otherwise known as
the new fiscal equalisation system. The report ends
with an appraisal of the new system.
Swiss federalism and the past
fiscal equalisation system
Alongside direct democracy, the
federal structure is one of the
key founding principles of Swit-
zerland. Each of the 26 cantons
has its own constitution in addition to that of the
Confederation. The local authorities or municipali-
ties, of which there are some 2,800, also enjoy a high
degree of autonomy under the cantonal legislation.
In Swiss-style federalism, any task or jurisdiction not
specifically assigned to the Confederation under the
federal constitution falls within the competence of
the cantons. The same applies for taxation: the can-
tons are allowed to levy all taxes to which the Con-
federation is not exclusively entitled.As all constitu-
tional amendments require a referendum passed by a
majority of the electorate and a majority of the can-
tons, the barriers to change are high.
Accounting for almost 75 percent of overall state
spending and some 69 percent of state revenues, the
subnational units (i.e., the cantons and municipali-
ties) play a very important role in the Swiss federal
state (cf. Figure 1). The imbalance between the ex-
penditure and revenue side is corrected by a system
of vertical fiscal equalisation. The Confederation’s
sources of revenue are the personal income tax, the
value added tax and various excise duties. Taxes on
individual wealth, firm capital and expenditure are
levied at the cantonal and local levels only.Earnings-
related direct taxes, i.e. personal and corporate
income tax, are levied at all three federal levels.The
taxation autonomy of cantonal and local authorities
was curbed to a certain extent in 2001 through the
introduction of formal tax harmonisation, which
seeks to simplify the canons of taxation, the assess-
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The former fiscal equalisation system was introduced
in Switzerland in 1959.It was further developed in the
decades that followed, sprawling out of control to
become a disordered and confusing system of vertical
fiscal transfers from the Confederation to the cantons.
The Swiss system had very little horizontal fiscal
equalisation such as that of the German Länder, for
instance.But Switzerland’s vertical fiscal transfers did
have an element of horizontal equalisation,as most of
the funds were raised by the “financially strong” can-
tons. For some of the less privileged cantons, fiscal
transfers from the Confederation accounted for up to
50 percent of their overall revenues.
The two main elements of the former fiscal equalisa-
tion system were:
• cantonal share in the revenues from direct feder-
al taxes, fuel excise tax and the earnings of the
Swiss National Bank, and 
• conditional (earmarked) grants and compensa-
tion from the Confederation to the cantons (fed-
eral contributions).
The amount transferred was determined by the can-
tons’ financial strength,covering four components:1.
the cantonal income per capita, 2. the cantonal and
local tax revenues per capita, 3. the average canton-
al tax burden, and 4. the percentage of mountainous
terrain in the cantons. The financial strength index
was used to divide the cantons into three groups:the
financially strong, the financially average and the
financially weak. The financially strong cantons had
a low share in federal taxes and low subsidy rates for
the federal contributions. Conversely, the financially
weak cantons had a higher share in federal taxes and
higher contribution rates.
The allocation effect of fiscal equalisation per se
amounted to some CHF 2.8 billion in 2006 (approx-
imately EUR 1.7 billion).The Confederation as well
as most of the cantons viewed this as insufficient.
Over time, areas of overlap have developed between
the Confederation and the cantons in terms of tasks
and expenditures.Although healthcare, education and
culture are primarily the responsibility of the cantons
(and municipalities),the Confederation – as a financial
contributor – also has an important say in these issues.
There is also shared responsibility for social services
and transportation and for the environment, regional
policy and agriculture. In effect, the sharing of expen-
ditures favours executive federalism and restricts the
cantons’ autonomy. Nonetheless, compared with other
states,Swiss federalism can still be said to allow its sub-
national units substantial autonomy.
The new fiscal equalisation reform package
With a view to stepping up the cantons’ autonomy,
improving the controllability and effectiveness of fis-
cal equalisation and halting the trend towards exec-
utive federalism, the federal government and the
cantons embarked upon an extensive overhaul of the
federal fiscal relationships in 1992.This reform pack-
age comprises the following six elements: the disen-
tanglement of tasks, an overhaul of the co-operation
between the Confederation and the cantons, the fos-
tering of intercantonal cooperation with equalisation
of burdens, the equalisation of financial strength
(resource levelling), the equalisation of financial
needs (compensation for special burdens),and hard-
ship relief as a temporary interim instrument.
Disentanglement of tasks
Of the 31 tasks previously shared,15 were complete-
ly transferred to the cantons’ responsibility and six
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Table 1 
Disentanglement of tasks (some of the main tasks that have been reassigned) 
Tasks assigned solely to
the Confederation
Common tasks between 
Confederation/cantons
Shared cantonal tasks










Nature, landscape, noise preven-
tion and water protection
Cantonal universities
Technical colleges




Homes for the disabled, the
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placed under federal responsi-
bility. This disentangled a total
of some CHF 5 billion (around
EUR 3 billion). As a rule, tasks
were allocated on the basis of
the subsidiary principle: public
tasks were only assigned to the
Confederation if the cantons
could no longer take them on.
This is the case for national pub-
lic goods, i.e. those benefiting a
broad circle of users across all
regions. Under the new system,
apart from those tasks assigned
exclusively to the Confederation
or the cantons, there are now
very few shared and common tasks (cf.Table 1).
Vertical cooperation between the Confederation and
the cantons
Because so many vertical fiscal transfers are current-
ly conditional grants and are calculated on the basis
of the costs incurred and the financial strength, the
cantons with high subsidy rates have sought to
receive high federal contributions. Such incentives
have distorted the priorities for tasks and created
inefficiencies in the performance of public tasks.
To overcome this problem, the new system provides
for a new form of vertical co-operation between the
Confederation and the cantons, designed along the
same lines as New Public Management. For those
tasks of national interest, where the Confederation
calls upon the cantons to perform them, it will in
future confine itself to taking strategic decisions.The
cantons are responsible for operational matters.The
Confederation has to negotiate its interests in part-
nership with the cantons.The results of such negoti-
ations are drawn up in programme agreements.
Here, the cantons are required to consider overlying
interests, while the Confederation provides global
contributions for programmes instead of, as up to
now, conditional contributions to specific projects.
This new vertical cooperation should ensure a more
efficient use of funds, as the cantons are free to opti-
mise their use of federal funds within the negotiated
scope.
However, this element of partnership is not consis-
tent throughout the new fiscal equalisation system.
For instance,the Confederation can enact decrees on
subsidies, if necessary by means of unilateral legisla-
tion.There are also provisions in place should nego-
tiations break down between the Confederation and
a canton.This has given the Confederation, a priori,
a stronger negotiating position than the cantons.
Furthermore, it is authorised to sanction any “inap-
propriate action” on the part of the cantons.
Intercantonal co-operation with equalisation
of burdens
Until the mid-twentieth century, most of the Swiss
population lived, worked and used public services in
one and the same canton. Nowadays, hundreds of
thousands of people commute across cantonal bor-
ders every day. This is so often the case in Switzer-
land because, compared with the subnational units
of other countries, Swiss cantons are very small
(cf. Table 2) with an average surface area of around
1600 km2. The smallest canton (Basel Town) is only
37 km2. The public services of one canton are in-
creasingly being used by those living in other can-
tons, resulting in spillovers (geographical external
effects).The absence of co-determination rights and
inadequate contributions to the costs of central ser-
vices mean that the population receives insufficient
support. The principle of fiscal equivalence is thus
violated.Particularly in urban regions,there is now a
geographical mismatch between those paying the
costs, those reaping the benefits and those making
the decisions.
The spillover compensation is primarily a matter for
the regional authorities affected.Under the new sys-
tem, the Confederation merely provides the instru-
ments required. To ensure that solutions can be
found in partnership between cantons on an equal
standing, the provider must offer certain services in
Table 2 
Average size of Swiss cantons compared with EU territorial units
Switzerland European Community (1987)
Cantons NUTS1 NUTS2 NUTS3
Subnational units 26 71 183 1044
Inhabitants (in millions) 0.28 4.9 1.8 0.4
Surface area (1000 km
2) 1.6 35.6 13.3 2.8
Note: NUTS = Nomenclature des Unités Territoriales Statistiques (nomen-
clature of territorial units for statistics) 
Example for Germany  
 NUTS1 =  Federal Länder
 NUTS2 =  Regierungsbezirke (primary administrative divisionof a Land) 
 NUTS3 =  Kreise (district)
Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch (2004), p. 64; Bundesamt für Statistik (1999),
p. 23; Eurostat 1998.return, particularly by creating cost transparency,
guaranteeing the same rights and obligations for all
cantons involved, and by institutionalising co-deter-
mination rights for the paying cantons.The proposed
solution can be seen as a step towards fiscal equiva-
lence. Instead of actually merging cantons as a
means of adapting institutions to urban growth –
something that is not really a political reality in
Switzerland for the foreseeable future – this serves
as a functional solution. However, there is still the
danger that the beneficiary cantons may prefer to
continue their free riding. For this reason, the new
system allows the Confederation, under certain cir-
cumstances, to exercise a contractual obligation at
the request of the cantons.
Equalisation of financial strength
The equalisation of financial strength, known as
“resource levelling”, is used solely for redistribution
purposes and is now clearly separated from alloca-
tion objectives on the basis that each objective has
an instrument, in each case the
one that best suits.
Replacing the former financial
strength index, the resource
index is based on the cantonal
tax potential. Unlike before, the
cantons will no longer be in a
position to directly influence
their financial strength, specifi-
cally via their tax policy.
Equalisation of financial needs
There are two elements to the
equalisation of financial needs.
First, geographic cost compensa-
tion takes account of the higher
expenses incurred by mountain-
ous cantons as a result of their
sparse population and the diffi-
cult topographical conditions.
Secondly,socio-demographic cost
compensation takes account of
the additional expenses incurred
by conurbations as a result of
their unfavourable population
structure. Due to the phenome-
na connected with urban sprawl,
the percentage of population
groups costing the community
more than they contribute in cantons with large
towns is far above average in comparison with the
surrounding areas and the national average.
Hardship relief
If the new fiscal equalisation system consisted only
of the previous five elements,the transition from the
old system to the new one would have resulted in
some of the poorer cantons losing out on revenues
from federal sources. Given that it would have been
difficult to explain, leading up to the referendum,
why the financially weak cantons appear to come off
the worst in switching to the new system (even if this
is supposed to be so under the new criteria for
resource capacity and special burdens), it was decid-
ed to set up a transitional hardship relief fund of
CHF 365 million (approximately EUR 220 million).
The Confederation finances two thirds of this, with
the rest coming from the cantons.The hardship relief
fund can be interpreted as an attempt to distribute
the reform profits fairly,i.e.compensating those who
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Table 3 
The former financialstrength index and the new resource index 
Criteria for determining the cantons’ financial strength
Former financial strength index Resource index under the new
system
• Per capita income
• Tax revenues per inhabitant
• Average tax burden(reciprocal)
• Percentage of mountainous
 terrain (reciprocal)
• Taxable income of individual
 taxpayers
• Earnings from taxable assets of
individual taxpayers
• Taxable profit of firms
Per cantonal inhabitant in each case





341  341 
243 
121 
Financially strong cantons 
Cantons with special burdens 
  Confederation 
Towns  Mountains Horizontal Vertical  
Resource levelling  
FISCAL FLOWS UNDER THE NEW SYSTEM
in CHF million
Equalisation of burdens Hardship relief 
Figure 2
Source: Information brochure for the Swiss referendum of 28 November 2004.CESifo DICE Report 1/2008 25
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lose out and moving the system closer to a win-win
situation.
Just how strong the redistributive effect of the new
fiscal equalisation system should be is a matter of
political debate. In 2007, Parliament decided to
increase the redistribution fund by some 50 percent,
from around CHF 2 billion to over CHF 3 billion a
year (EUR 1.2 billion to EUR 1.8 billion;cf.Figure 2).
Appraisal of the new fiscal equalisation system
The constitutional principles were only agreed upon
in 2004. It then took almost three years to pass the
implementing legislation.This came into effect at the
beginning of 2008. Thus we have not yet had much
experience with the new fiscal equalisation system,
and it will take another few years before certain ele-
ments can even be implemented.
To a certain extent,the impact of the new system will
depend on how the cantons respond to the various
transfers. A financially weak canton receiving addi-
tional funding with the fiscal equalisation system can
respond in three ways: it can cut taxes, increase
spending or reduce debt.The financially strong can-
tons that find themselves with a greater burden
under the new system can opt to raise taxes, cut
spending through more efficient provision of state
benefits, or increase debt. In anticipation of the new
system,some of the winning cantons already decided
in 2005 to lower taxes, thereby intensifying intercan-
tonal tax competition.
Figure 3 shows how the 26 cantons are likely to be
affected by the new fiscal equal-
isation system. Overall, as the
chart shows,the cantons with the
greatest burden are,for the most
part, those previously classified
as financially strong. However,
this chart only shows the trans-
fer payments. If the impact of
the overhaul of vertical and hor-
izontal cooperation were to be
taken into account, probably all
cantons would come out win-
ners. The fact that the cantons
will increasingly receive pay-
ments not earmarked for a spe-
cific purpose means that they
can make better use of each
franc transferred for their own residents than under
the previous system.
A wide range of criticism of the new fiscal equalisa-
tion system was voiced in the parliamentary debate
and prior to the referendum:
• The left-wing parties and the trade unions object-
ed to the fact that tax competition continues to
exist among the cantons and is merely made
“more tolerable” by the new system.They threat-
ened with an initiative to amend the federal con-
stitution so as to limit the differences in the can-
tons’ tax burdens to ± 20 percent of the national
average.
• Western Switzerland, which more closely resem-
bles France in its approach, tends to make more
demands on the level of public spending than
German-speaking cantons. The French-speaking
cantons claimed that the new system did not take
sufficient account of this.
• Some legal experts in constitutional law were
concerned that the Confederation may under cer-
tain (albeit very restrictive) conditions force dissi-
dent cantons to provide horizontal co-operation
and financial compensation for spillovers in
regional tasks.
• Advocates of the social state feared its demise as
the disentanglement of tasks gives the cantons a
broader sphere of competence. These were sup-
ported in their opposition to a certain extent by
the social welfare offices of the Confederation
and the cantons,which feared losing some of their
authority (“pillarisation”).
• Some financially weak cantons in mountainous
regions would have preferred to see an even
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Source: Own calculations,based on EFD and KdK (2007), p. 31.
DIRECT FINANCIAL IMPACT OF THE NEW FISCAL EQUALISATION SYSTEM: 
Overall balance after hardship equalisation
burden in Swiss francs per inhabitant (model calculation 2004/05)
donor cantons recipient cantons
Figure 3tons.They have now shifted their attention to try-
ing to retain the previously hidden inter-regional
redistribution as part of regional and sector-spe-
cific policies (e.g.for transport,environment,agri-
culture).The new fiscal equalisation system wants
– if not quite explicitly – to replace this somewhat
inefficient and ineffective redistribution scheme
with the new transfer system, in other words, to
gear the regional and sector-specific policies to
allocation and growth objectives.
• Some financially strong cantons opposed the new
fiscal equalisation system as they felt they were
being too heavily burdened and would lose their
international competitiveness. These cantons,
which are most heavily burdened under the new
system, were in fact the ones that rejected the
reforms in the referendum.
Such criticism has had little effect, however.The ref-
erendum was passed by a majority of the electorate
(64 percent) and by 23 of the 26 cantons.
It is also interesting to see that the OECD believes
these reforms reduce regional disparities to an inter-
nationally comparable level and afford the cantons
greater financial autonomy. It notes that, with the
possibility of forcing cantons to cooperate, Swit-
zerland is entering new territory within the OECD.
Therefore, and based on Switzerland’s experience to
date, it could well play a key role in promoting hori-
zontal cooperation.
Concluding remarks
• The new fiscal equalisation system is an impor-
tant and necessary step towards strengthening
Swiss federalism.
• The new fiscal equalisation system takes intercan-
tonal tax competition to a tolerable level.
• Further federalism reforms will be required in the
medium to long term. Most of the present can-
tonal boundaries were set by the Congress of
Vienna back in 1815, and these no longer corre-
spond to today’s population centres and econom-
ic poles. Such a long-term reform can only suc-
ceed if, as evidenced in the preparations for the
new fiscal equalisation system, it is conducted in
close co-operation with the cantons.However,the
initiative in this respect must come from the can-
tons themselves.
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